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You have asked for our advice.	
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V. In November 2004, the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) informed the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) that the Agency had established a program in the Counter
Terrorism Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the CTC
program"). He also informed the OIG that he had just dispatched a team to investigate
. Separately, OIG received information
that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an
overseas detention and interrogation site might involve human rights violations. In
January 2005, OIG initiated a review of Agency counterterrorism and detention activities
related to and the incident with
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This review will determine whether there has
been any professional misconduct in the treatment of
covers the period September 2002 to 2007.
VI.
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VII.
have faced great difficulty in completing this review. There are generally two
circumstances in which we would make a finding of professional misconduct. (1) Where
Agency personnel have intentionally violated an obligation or standard imposed by law,
(2) where agency personnel have acted in reckless disregard of their obligation to
comply with that standard. We may also find professional misconduct in cases where
agency personnel have intentionally ignored instructions from higher-ranking personnel.
Finally, we may also find that Agency personnel have exhibited bad judgment, made

VIII. In order to assess whether an incident is the result of professional misconduct, it has been necessary to reconstruct, as precisely as possible, the chain of direct commands, the precise legal history, and the states of mind of the concerned, in the

mistakes, or unintentionally violated legal norms or unintentionally disobeyed direct

instructions; such findings do not constitute professional misconduct.

Case of difficult. Most of the videotapes related to the incidents in question were accidentally destroyed. We have been hampered by our need to seek voluntary co-operation of witnesses (in the case of almost all Agency lawyers, and for all the witnesses from the White House aside from Alberto Gonzalez). Our investigation was slowed by witnesses' reluctance to provide information, as well as time spent obtaining the necessary security clearances for the staff involved in the case. Further, we were not allowed to copy or to retain copies of many of the key documents, which increased the difficulty of our task. All these problems were exacerbated by the loss of key email records.<sup>5</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Appendix A addresses the Procedure and Resources that the OIG employed in conducting this review. The review does not addresses interrogations conducted jointly with

initially provided us with a relatively small number of emails, files and draft documents. After it became apparent, during the course of our review, that relevant documents were missing, we requested and were given direct access to the email and computer records of Philbin, Bybee and Goldsmith. However, we were told that most of Yoo's email records had been deleted and were not recoverable.